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Abstract 
The current paper presents a future research agenda for intolerance of uncertainty (IU), which is 
a transdiagnostic risk and maintaining factor for emotional disorders. In light of the accumulating 
interest and promising research on IU, it is timely to emphasize the theoretical and therapeutic 
significance of IU, as well as to highlight what remains unknown about IU across areas such as 
development, assessment, behavior, and relationships to emotional disorders. The present paper 
was designed to provide a synthesis of what is known and unknown about IU, and, in doing so, 
proposes broad and novel directions for future research to address the remaining uncertainties in 
the literature. 
Keywords: intolerance of uncertainty, review, emotional disorders, transdiagnostic, 
disorder-specific, research agenda 
WHAT UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN? 3 
1. Intolerance of Uncertainty in Emotional Disorders: What Uncertainties Remain? 
The current paper briefly reviews what is known about intolerance of uncertainty (IU) 
before highlighting what remains unknown. Due to rapidly increasing interest and research focus 
on IU, culminating in the current special issue, a review is both timely and necessary to set a 
future research agenda.  This paper will review IU with respect to conceptual foundations and 
definitional issues, development, assessment, behavioral consequences, associations to threat and 
risk, other cognitive vulnerability factors, emotional disorders, as well as clinical applications. 
Within each of these domains, what is currently known will first be briefly reviewed followed by 
what remains unknown. The major contribution of the current paper is the description of future 
research avenues to address the known unknowns. 
2. Conceptual Foundations of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
2.1 What is known? 
Models of psychopathology posit that uncertainty is a central feature in anxiety-related 
experience (Carleton, 2016) and the incapacity to endure unknowns appears to be a robust 
vulnerability factor associated with a range of psychological disorders (Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; 
Hong & Cheung, 2015). IU was originally defined as a broad construct that reflects “cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral reactions to uncertainty in everyday life situations” (Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994, p. 792). Freeston and colleagues (1994) 
speculated that people with IU may engage in worry to increase their sense of certainty and 
control when faced with ambiguity. The definition of IU evolved as research on IU shifted from 
an initial focus on generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) to other disorders. A revised and broader 
definition described IU as a predisposition to negatively perceive and respond to uncertain 
information and situations irrespective of its probability and outcomes (Ladouceur, Blais, 
WHAT UNCERTAINTIES REMAIN? 4 
Freeston, & Dugas, 1998; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). IU has also been 
conceptualized as a cognitive filter and as the excessive tendency to perceive and interpret 
negative events as unacceptable (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2001). 
Individuals with high IU have the tendency to appraise ambiguity as threatening and experience 
heightened physiological arousal (Greco & Roger, 2001, 2003; Hock & Krohne, 2004). 
Furthermore, difficulties tolerating uncertainty may represent the tendency to believe that 
uncertainty in itself is distressing, unfair, and should be avoided (Dugas, Marchand, & 
Ladouceur, 2005; Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004). Current consenseus describes IU as a 
“dispositional characteristic that reflects a set of negative beliefs about uncertainty and its 
implications” (Dugas & Robichaud, 2007), and represents an underlying fear of the unknown 
(Carleton, this issue).  Carleton (2016, p. 31) recently proposed that IU represents a broad 
“incapacity to endure the aversive response triggered by the perceived absence of salient, key, or 
sufficient information”. 
Recent measurement research sheds light on the conceptual nature of IU, postulating that 
that IU comprises two dimensions; prospective IU (e.g., “I always want to know what the future 
has in store for me”) and inhibitory IU (e.g., “When its time to act, uncertainty paralyzes me”; 
Carleton, 2012; Carleton, Sharpe, & Asmundson, 2007; Hong & Cheung, 2015; McEvoy & 
Mahoney, 2011), sometimes referred to as desire for predictability and uncertainty paralysis, 
respectively (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & Thompson, 2008; Birrell, Meares, Wilkinson, & 
Freeston, 2011). Both prospective and inhibitory IU are conceptualized as responses to 
uncertainty such that prospective IU represents cognitive appraisals of threat related to future 
uncertainty while inhibitory IU represents behavioral inhibition related to uncertainty (Carleton, 
2012; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007; Einstein, 2014).  
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IU has predominantly been conceptualized as a dispositional trait (Mahoney & McEvoy, 
2012c); however, recent research suggests distinctions can be made between trait IU and 
disorder-specific IU (Thibodeau et al., 2015), sometimes referred to as situation-specific IU 
(Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a, 2012c). Mahoney and McEvoy (2012c) were the first to 
conceptualize dimensions of the IU construct as disorder-specific based on early speculations 
that general experiences of uncertainty may differ across disorders and thus situations (Carleton, 
Gosselin, & Asmundson, 2010; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Foa, 2003). For example, 
uncertainty about catastrophic consequences of physical symptoms in panic disorder may differ 
from uncertainty about social evaluative cues in social anxiety disorder. Thus, the nature of 
uncertainty may differ between emotional disorders and IU may manifest differently based on 
contextual factors (Boswell, Thompson-Hollands, Farchione, & Barlow, 2013; Carleton, 2016; 
Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c). State IU can be considered as any instance of heightened negative 
affect in response to an uncertain stimulus, which may or may not co-occur with high trait IU or 
occur within the context of emotional disorders.  
Mahoney and McEvoy (2012c) found that clinical participants reported higher disorder-
specific IU relative to trait IU. Further, disorder-specific IU displayed a significant, but modest, 
association with depression and panic disorder symptoms beyond trait IU, but not for social 
anxiety, worry, or obsessive-compulsive disorder symptoms. Additionally, Mahoney and 
McEvoy (2012a) reported no significant differences between trait and disorder-specific IU 
amongst individuals with GAD, social anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. Thus, in line with 
normative descriptive research (e.g., Carleton et al., 2012), trait IU appeared comparable across 
disorders, supporting IU as a transdiagnostic construct. 
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Jensen and Heimberg (2015) extended this research by comparing diagnostically-
congruent and -incongruent situations using a non-anxious control and two anxious groups. The 
socially anxious and obsessive-compulsive groups reported higher disorder-specific IU relative 
to trait or disorder-incongruent IU. Further, the socially anxious and control groups reported 
similar IU levels with regard to contamination concerns, while the obsessive-compulsive and 
control groups reported similar IU levels with regard to social interactions (Jensen & Heimberg, 
2015). Thus, in line with recent theory (Carleton, 2016), context remains a critical component for 
considering uncertainty threatening, even for persons reporting high trait IU and anxiety 
symptoms.  
Thibodeau and colleauges (2015) also found disorder-specific IU was associated with 
unique variance in concordent symptom measures (e.g., disorder-specific IU in social situations 
predicted symptoms for social anxiety; disorder-specific IU in bodily sensations predicted 
symptoms for panic disorder). Relative to disorder-specific IU, trait IU explained more unique 
variance in GAD and obsessive-compulsive disorder, but less unique variance in social anxiety 
and panic disorder symptoms. Disorder-specific and trait IU accounted for similar proportions of 
unique variance in symptoms of health anxiety, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
specific phobia. Taken together, research suggests the generalizability of IU varies, with some 
disorders appearing more strongly associated with disorder-specific IU than trait IU (Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012a; Thibodeau et al., 2015). Moreover, expressions of disorder-specific and trait IU 
may be dependent on context, with intolerance increasing during exposure to disorder-congruent 
situations (Jensen & Heimberg, 2015; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a).  
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2.2 What is unknown?  
Converging evidence highlights the possibility that  IU comprises both prospective IU 
(desire for predictability) and inhibitory IU (uncertainty paralysis); nevertheless, future research 
should examine the theoretical nature of prospective and inhibitory IU, and the relationships 
between these two dimensions and other aspects of psychopathology, including affective, 
behavioral, cognitive, and interpersonal factors. For example, investigating whether prospective 
IU is more strongly related to approach behaviors designed to stave off future uncertainty and 
whether inhibitory IU is more strongly associated with avoidance behaviors to minimize 
exposure to uncertainty (Birrell et al., 2011).   
The historical focus on trait IU has left the role of disorder-specific IU in emotional 
disorders less clear. Further research is needed to elucidate the nature of IU across disorders, 
each of which may involve varying degrees of trait and disorder-specific IU (Thibodeau et al., 
2015). There is also a need to clarify the predictive nature of disorder-specific IU in emotional 
disorders. Disorder-specific and trait IU need to be delineated and integrated into theoretical 
models to provide a framework for this endeavor. Distinguishing between disorder-specific IU, 
trait IU, and symptoms may have important treatment implications, such as guiding targets for 
exposure or psychoeducation. Alternatively, for some or most disorders targeting trait IU may 
sufficiently generalize to disorder-specific IU, or vice versa, offering several potential avenues 
for reducing IU-related vulnerability for primary and comorbid emotional problems. Answers to 
these questions are currently unknown. 
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3. Development of Intolerance of Uncertainty  
3.1 What is known?  
Associations between IU, other cognitive vulnerabilities, and anxiety-related 
psychopathology underscore the important theoretical and clinical implications of understanding 
IU development processes (Barlow, Bullis, Comer, & Ametaj, 2013). For example, elucidating 
pathways by which transdiagnostic processes lead to multiple diagnoses (i.e., multifinality) and 
different disorders (i.e., divergent trajectories) in different people may be critical for advancing 
theory, treatment, and prevention (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Indirect research and 
theory implicates the developmental importance of IU (Carleton, 2016); however, direct research 
into the development of IU is nascent and is reviewed here with a focus on potential processes 
and developmental origins. We consider IU as a proximal transdiagnostic risk factor akin to 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkin’s (2011) proposed heuristic for developing transdiagnostic models, 
which incorporates distal factors, proximal factors, and linking mechanisms for 
psychopathology.  
Distal risk factors may include early family contexts characterized by over-protective and 
controlling parenting. These parenting styles may decrease children’s perceived control and self-
efficacy, resulting in maladaptive cognitive strategies, negative perceptions of uncertainty, worry, 
and anxiety (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Chorpita & Barlow, 1998). Zlomke and Young (2009) found 
participants who reported that their parents displayed adverse behaviors (i.e., anxious rearing and 
rejection) had significantly higher IU. Importantly, these researchers found that the relationship 
between anxious parenting and both anxiety and worry symptoms was mediated by IU. Dugas, 
Laugensen, and Bukowski (2012) conducted longitudinal research investigating the temporal 
relationship between IU and worry during adolescence, providing evidence that changes in IU 
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partially mediate change in worry and vice-versa. Accordingly, Dugas and colleagues (2012) 
suggested that worry and IU have a reciprocal relationship over time, with adolescent IU 
potentiating worry through threatening appraisals of uncertainty and maladaptive behaviors 
similarly to adults (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Gosselin et al., 2008). These researchers 
observed that transition periods at the start and finish of secondary school were associated with 
the highest levels of IU, and they suggested that multiple changes during adolescence (e.g., 
emotional, social, academic; Steinberg, 2005) may have a cumulative effect of increasing IU.  
Recent theoretical models (see Grupe & Nitschke, 2013; Wever, Smeets, & Sternheim, 
2015) implicate several neural structures that may be impacted by, and underlie the expression 
of, IU. The neurologically-based models are based on functional magnetic resonance imaging 
evidence that has implicated the insula, amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and posterior frontomedian cortex 
as related to IU (Krain et al., 2006; Motzkin, Philippi, Wolf, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2014; 
Sarinopoulos et al., 2009; Schienle, Köchel, Ebner, Reishofer, & Schäfer, 2010; Simmons, 
Matthews, Paulus, & Stein, 2008; Thayer, Åhs, Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). 
Hyperactivation of these brain regions appears to be associated with maladaptive cognitive and 
behavioral processes, including hypervigilance for uncertain or threatening stimuli (Wever et al., 
2015). Associations between IU and hypervigilance have also been supported by information 
processing studies indicating a cognitive bias (Fergus, Bardeen, & Wu, 2013; Fergus & Carleton, 
this issue). Similarly, uncertainty appears related to increases in heart rate variability (Thayer et 
al., 2012), implicating broad influence throughout the attentional networks and autonomic 
nervous system.  
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3.2 What is unknown?  
There is a paucity of research on IU during childhood and adolescence; such research is 
critical. Different neurodevelopmental stages contribute to differences in processing uncertainty, 
which limits generalizability from adult studies to child populations (Krain et al., 2006). 
Extending research by Wright, Adams Lebell, and Carleton (this issue), future research should 
examine associations between IU and a range of emotional disorders to inform the 
transdiagnostic nature of IU in child and adolescent populations. Future research using 
prospective and longitudinal designs are needed. Moderators may shape the effects of trait IU 
into particular symptoms and disorder-specific IU, helping to explain how this vulnerability 
results in divergent trajectories or multifinality (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). Such 
moderation hypotheses accord with the assertion made by Thibodeau and colleagues (2015, p. 
55) that disorder-specific IU may represent a “theoretically proximal and explicit causal 
intermediary” between trait IU and disorder symptoms. Trait IU may shape disorder-specific IU 
through learning, operant conditioning, and modelling, which would shape cognitive and 
behavioral responses to situational stressors and consequences. A comprehensive review of the 
interplay between these factors is beyond the scope of this review, but further research 
examining these relationships is required. 
Carleton and colleagues (2012) suggested that rather than investigating discrete causal 
factors, researchers should explore a range of environmental, genetic, or biological variables that 
may shape IU. Identifying neural structures related to IU may explain whether IU functions as a 
shared or specific vulnerability factor (Simmons et al., 2008; Wever et al., 2015). Researchers 
have yet to explore potential links between IU and congenital biological abnormalities; as such, 
future researchers and theorists should consider the potential influence of genetically based 
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dispositions that may confer risk for IU. Future researchers should strive to understand the 
connections between genetic, neural, and cognitive correlates, all of which may facilitate IU and 
psychopathology (Sanislow et al., 2010). Advancing our understanding of the neurobiological, 
genetic, and environmental origins of IU is important for advancing our understanding of 
multifinality and divergent disorder-specific trajectories, as well as preventative and therapeutic 
interventions (Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012b; Simmons et al., 2008; Wever et al., 2015). 
4. Assessment of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
4.1 What is known?  
There are several self-report measures designed to assess IU; however, the specific 
content has often been revisited over the past two decades of IU theory development. The 27-
item IU Scale (IUS) was the first measure developed to assess IU and responses to uncertain 
situations (Freeston et al., 1994). Psychometric evaluations demonstrate excellent internal 
consistency, test-retest reliability, and construct validity (Freeston et al., 1994); nevertheless, 
factor analytic evidence prior to 2007 suggested the IUS had an unstable, complex factor 
structure with potentially redundant items (Carleton, Norton, et al., 2007). For example, 
consistent with its original intent, the IUS includes items that specifically relate to GAD and 
worry, which may impact transdiagnostic applications (Gentes & Ruscio, 2011). Complications 
with the IUS factor structure coupled with suggestions that item removal would be unlikely to 
affect scale reliability (Norton, 2005) led to the development of a 12-item short form (i.e., IU 
Scale, Short Form; IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, et al., 2007). The IUS-12 comprised two factors, 
relabeled as prospective IU and inhibitory IU by McEvoy and Mahoney (2011). The IUS-12 has 
strong psychometric properties and is a viable transdiagnostic assessment tool for trait IU 
(Khawaja & Yu, 2010). 
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Subsequent research with the full IUS (Sexton & Dugas, 2009) and a very large sample 
demonstrated a reliable two factor structure (i.e., uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything; 
uncertainty has negative behavioral and self-referent implications), with the items for each 
mapping onto the IUS-12 factors (Carleton, Norton, et al., 2007; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). 
The IUS and IUS-12 overlap such that both are considered defensible and generally comparable 
tools for assessing IU (Khawaja &Yu, 2010); however, that same conceptual overlap in assessing 
general reactions to uncertainty or “trait” IU has led some researchers to posit that potential 
biases might arise when examining IU and emotional disorders, such as an inflated association 
between IU and GAD relative to other disorders (Gosselin et al., 2008). In response to such 
concerns, the 45-item IU Inventory (IUI) was developed (Carleton, Gosselin, et al., 2010; 
Gosselin et al., 2008). The IUI comprises two distinct parts and, accordingly, distinguishes 
between trait IU (Part A) and six associated behavioral and cognitive expressions (i.e., 
avoidance, doubt, overestimation, worry, control, reassurance; Part B). Psychometric evidence 
indicates the IUI has good reliability, temporal stability, and convergent and incremental validity 
(Carleton, Gosselin, et al., 2010; Gosselin et al., 2008).  
Comer et al. (2009) revised the IUS items to ensure comprehensibility for children, 
resulting in the first validated measure of IU for children, the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
for Children (IUSC). Preliminary psychometric evidence for the IUSC is promising (Comer et 
al., 2009). Another measure for use with children is the unpublished 12-item IU Scale-Revised 
(IUS-R; Walker, Birrell, Rogers, Leekam, & Freeston, 2010) based upon the IUS-12 (Carleton, 
Norton, et al., 2007). Research exploring IU with children is increasing (Comer et al., 2009; 
Fialko, Bolton, & Perrin, 2012; Kertz & Woodruff-Borden, 2013); however, the use of different 
measures limits direct comparisons between studies.  
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Theoretical distinctions between trait and disorder-specific IU prompted the development 
of the IU Scale-Situation-Specific Version (IUS-SS; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c). The IUS-SS 
is an adapted version of the IUS-12. Respondents describe a personally distressing, regularly 
occurring, and specific situation within one of four disorder-specific domains (social evaluative, 
intrusive thoughts/repetitive behaviors, worry, panic) before completing the IUS-12 items 
referencing the specific situation. Psychometric evidence demonstrates a unitary factor structure, 
good reliability, and convergent and discriminant validity. To extend the scope of other measures 
by focusing IU within discrete symptom categories, the 24-item Disorder-Specific IU Scale 
(DSIU) was designed (Thibodeau et al., 2015). The DSIU comprises eight subscales assessing IU 
in the context of various disorder symptoms including GAD, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
social anxiety, health anxiety, panic disorder, specific phobia, posttraumatic stress disorder, and 
depressive disorder. Psychometric research indicates high reliability, convergent and criterion 
validity, but research is required to assess the temporal stability and clinical validity of the DSIU 
(Thibodeau et al., 2015).  
4.2 What is unknown?  
Psychometric evaluations of the IUI and IUSC are limited and further testing is required 
within a broader array of adult and child clinical populations, respectively. All measures of IU 
require further validation across ethnically diverse samples. Different operational definitions 
underlie the development of each measure (Fergus, 2013). For example, the IUS-12 and the IUI 
Part A assess responses to uncertainty and the tendency to consider uncertainty intolerable, 
respectively. Thus, when making decisions about which self-report measures to use researchers 
need to consider the distinct item content of each measure (Fergus, 2013) and provide an overall 
theoretical framework to clearly articulate how these aspects of IU relate to each other and to 
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other constructs. Future treatment studies also need to investigate whether existing self-report 
measures are able to effectively guide case formulations and treatment plans to improve 
outcomes for individuals with emotional disorders.   
The proliferation of and focus on self-report measures has advanced our understanding of 
IU; however, exclusive reliance on self-report and often cross-sectional methods are also 
important limitations of existing research (Jacoby, Abramowitz, Buck, & Fabricant, 2014). Self-
report data may be vulnerable to subjective response biases and shared method variance, which 
can inflate associations between variables. Cross-sectional research can provide information 
about the associations between theoretically related variables, but precludes the ability to draw 
causal conclusions. Accordingly, broad theoretical and applied progress for understanding IU 
will require valid and reliable multimodal assessments (Carleton, 2012, 2016; Einstein, 2014).   
5. Insights into Intolerance of Uncertainty from Behavior  
5.1 What is known?  
 Current research suggests that IU is characterized by cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
facets, and may have a broad influence on emotional disorders (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
Carleton,2016; Freeston et al., 1994; Thibodeau, Carleton, Gómez-Pérez, & Asmundson, 2013). 
Researchers have experimentally induced or manipulated uncertainty and examined the 
correlates of self-report IU and responses to uncertain situations (Jacoby, Abramowitz, Reuman, 
& Blakey, this issue). The manipulations have included tasks such as overt behavioral 
assessments, a typing task, bead selection tasks, and a cold pressor task. The results have 
indicated people with higher IU 1) prefer immediately available rewards, even when they are less 
probable or less valuable (Luhmann, Ishida, & Hajcak, 2011); 2) are less confident about high 
risk decisions, but also less likely to change their decisions despite receiving new information 
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(Jensen, Kind, Morrison, & Heimberg, 2014); 3) are more likely to seek additional information 
to increase certainty in nonclinical samples (Jacoby et al., 2014; Jacoby, Abramowitz, Reuman, 
& Blakey, this issue; Ladouceur, Talbot, & Dugas, 1997; Rosen & Knäuper, 2009), though not 
consistently in clinical samples (Sternheim, Startup, & Schmidt, 2011); 4) are more likely to 
increase certainty by behaving, reacting, or deciding more slowly in clinical (Jacoby et al., 2014) 
and nonclinical samples (Jacoby et al., 2014; Jacoby et al., this issue; Thibodeau et al., 2013); 
and 5) are more likely to be distressed by uncertainty in clinical (Jacoby et al., 2014) and 
nonclinical samples (Jacoby et al., this issue). Taken together, these experimental results suggest 
that manipulating uncertainty may adversely impact behaviors and decision-making, even with 
relatively low levels of perceived threat. In addition, Jacoby and colleagues (2014) suggest the 
beads task could be modified to maximize external validity by focusing on specific idiosyncratic 
concerns of participants.  
5.2 What is unknown?   
There is a relative paucity of research exploring the relationship between self-reported IU 
on behavior and decision-making. A multi-modal approach will help researchers and clinicians to 
better assess the latent IU construct and its consequences. To advance our understanding of the 
associations between the latent IU construct and a broad range of behaviors, researchers should 
investigate behaviors characterized by higher-order processes (e.g., probability-based decision-
making) as well as common daily behaviors (e.g., public speaking). Researchers should address 
whether behaviors are driven by uncertainty itself or by the emotional consequences associated 
with uncertainty (Luhmann et al., 2011), as well as understanding the compounding influence of 
anticipated reinforcers (e.g., threat, reward). Moreover, a variety of experimental studies should 
be designed to elucidate whether uncertainty and the latent IU construct are associated with 
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explicit behavioral responses (e.g., impairment), perceptions of distress, cognitive consequences 
(Jacoby et al., this issue), or all three.  
Researchers could manipulate trait IU, disorder-specific IU, probability, and threat across 
disorder-congruent and -incongruent contexts and explore the interactive effects therein on 
emotional symptoms and behavior. For example, increasing uncertainty in situations pertinent to 
social anxiety (e.g., fear of being evaluated, performance anxiety), obsessive-compulsive 
concerns (e.g., contamination concerns, inflated perceptions of responsibility), a specific phobia, 
or health concerns (e.g., Rosen & Knäuper, 2009), while investigating emotional and behavioral 
correlates, including decision-making. Within different disorders, reduced decision-making 
confidence in varying domains (e.g., social scenarios) may exacerbate disorder-specific concerns 
contributing to anxiety or depressive symptoms (e.g., fear of negative evaluation for social 
anxiety disorder; Jensen et al., 2014). Research involving decision-making confidence, behavior, 
and IU would also provide insights into the content specificity or disorder-specific aspects of IU. 
Methodologically varied approaches with diverse samples will enhance our understanding of the 
trait and state expressions of IU and psychopathology (Jacoby et al., 2014). Future researchers 
should examine how the prospective and inhibitory IU dimensions are differentially related to 
behavior across more general and disorder-specific contexts. 
6. Intolerance of Uncertainty, Threat, and Risk  
6.1 What is known?  
According to Krohne’s (1989) coping theory, ambiguous or unpredictable situations may 
be viewed as threatening and difficulty tolerating uncertainty may result in an excessive tendency 
to search for threat cues. Vigilance to uncertainty and overestimating the probability and cost of 
threat appears to be involved in the development and perpetuation of fear and anxiety and 
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engagement in safety behaviors (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2002; Reuman, Jacoby, Fabricant, 
Herring, & Abramowitz, 2015). A link between high IU and the tendency to overestimate the 
likelihood of negative events has been documented (Dugas, Buhr, & Ladouceur, 2004; Dugas et 
al., 2005; Koerner & Dugas, 2008; Ladouceur et al., 1997), with uncertainty itself perceived as 
threatening. Attending to the uncertain aspects of a situation has been conceptualized as 
uncertainty-based reasoning (Reuman et al., 2015). Relatedly, IU may be sufficiently threatening 
that it leads to worry (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008; Dugas, Buhr, et al., 2004). Scenarios 
characterized by explicit uncertainty and high threat, instead of implicit or low threat, produced 
higher anxiety and urges to engage in safety behaviors; moreover, a low threat situation may be 
perceived as highly threatening when uncertainty is explicit (Reuman et al., 2015).   
6.2 What is unknown?  
Research examining the interaction between uncertainty and threat in anxiety and 
emotion is scant and more work is needed to clarify the associations. Researchers should design 
in vivo manipulations of threat, explicit uncertainty, and implicit uncertainty. Examining threat 
through vignettes or in vivo situations across a spectrum of symptoms may inform relationships 
between perceptions of threat and risk in disorder-specific contexts. Such designs may pose 
ethical challenges for researchers who will benefit most from ecologically valid scenarios; in any 
case, experimental and longitudinal designs are required to understand causal relationships 
between IU and estimations of probabilities and costs. In addition, evidence from multiple 
clinical samples will inform the generalizability across anxiety and depressive disorders.  
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7. Intolerance of Uncertainty as a Cognitive Vulnerability Process  
7.1 What is known?  
Recent research suggests that many vulnerability factors are associated with multiple 
disorders and are thus transdiagnostic (e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; 
Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Starcevic & Berle, 2006). 
Theory and empirical evidence has also supported a hierarchical conceptualization of emotional 
disorders, such that the influence of higher-order distal traits on disorder symptoms is mediated 
by intermediate cognitive factors (Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton, Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 
2005; Paulus, Talkovsky, Heggeness, & Norton, 2015; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003; 
van der Heiden et al., 2010). Researchers have focused on two distal temperament factors, 
namely neuroticism and extraversion, and evidence for a relationship between neuroticism and 
psychopathology is strong (Barlow, 2002; Barlow, Sauer-Zavala, Carl, Bullis, & Ellard, 2014; 
Brown & Naragon-Gainey, 2013; Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Watson, 2005). 
Neuroticism is closely related and largely overlapping with trait anxiety (Clark & Beck, 2010). 
Neuroticism could be referred to as reflecting a generalized biological vulnerability, although 
learned experiences are also likely to influence this vulnerability, as highlighted in Barlow’s 
(2000, 2002) triple vulnerability model. IU may reflect a generalized psychological vulnerability 
that stems from unknowns and perceptions of absent agency over emotions and environment, all 
of which facilitate neuroticism (Carleton,2016, this issue).  
IU appears to be a transdiagnostic cognitive vulnerability factor (Carleton,2016) 
associated with a host of other factors (e.g., anxiety sensitivity; ruminative style). Hong and 
Cheung (2015) suggested that several cognitive vulnerabilities may share a common core of IU 
and, therein, fearing the unknown. Indeed, IU mediates the relationship between neuroticism and 
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symptoms of worry, depression, social anxiety, and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Fergus & 
Wu, 2011; Hong, 2013; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012; Norton & Mehta, 2007; Norton et al., 2005; 
Sexton et al., 2003; van der Heiden et al., 2010). Researchers have also evidenced that 
prospective and inhibitory IU partially mediate the link between neuroticism and emotional 
disorders (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011).  
7.2 What is unknown?  
The need remains to disentangle the trait and disorder-specific cognitive vulnerabilities 
and overlapping transdiagnostic factors in emotional disorders. Carleton (2016) has offered an 
overview of processes through which IU may influence psychopathology; however, substantial 
work remains to be done investigating the specific processes. Inconsistencies in the extant IU 
literature exploring those specific processes may have resulted from discrepancies in 
methodological and analytical procedures (Hong, 2013). Future research should continue to 
evaluate hierarchical models of psychopathology, including IU (Norton & Paulus, 2015; Watson, 
2005), considering recent theoretical developments. 
Norton and Paulus (2015) assert that hierarchical conceptualizations can aid in 
identifying transdiagnostic processes with incremental explanatory power beyond higher-order 
factors like neuroticism or negative affect. Using a meta-analytic approach, Hong and Cheung 
(2015) examined the overlap among a range of vulnerabilities and found a lack of support for 
symptom specificity. In line with this and to address limitations of prior studies, future research 
should include multiple vulnerabilities simultaneously to examine the unique and shared 
magnitude of associations with different disorder symptoms (Brown & Naragon-Gainey, 2013; 
Hong & Cheung, 2015; Norton & Mehta, 2007). Furthermore, researchers should investigate 
how IU relates to, interacts with, and predicts other potential maintaining vulnerabilities such as 
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metacognitive beliefs, perceived control, and behavioral avoidance with longitudinal designs. 
Such research would increase our understanding of the general and specific importance of IU for 
cognitive vulnerabilities and corresponding disorder symptoms. The resulting insights will help 
identify risk factors and advance understanding of the temporal precedence and the relative 
importance of IU and other constructs (Carleton, 2016; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c; Norton & 
Paulus, 2015; Treanor, Erisman, Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011).  
8. Intolerance of Uncertainty as a Transdiagnostic Process 
8.1 What is known?  
IU was initially developed within the context of worry, a hallmark symptom of GAD, as 
outlined in the IU model (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998; Freeston et al., 1994). 
IU was thought to distinguish persons with GAD from other heterogeneous anxiety disorders 
(Dugas et al., 2001; Dugas et al., 2004; Ladouceur et al., 1999); however, the assertion of broad 
specificity for GAD was challenged by accumulating cross-sectional and meta-analytic evidence 
highlighting the significance of IU to other symptom constructs and disorders (e.g., Carleton et 
al., 2012; Gentes & Ruscio, 2011; Hong & Cheung, 2015; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011, 2012; 
Norton & Mehta, 2007; Starcevic & Berle, 2006). IU has been associated with symptoms of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Tolin et al., 2003), social 
anxiety disorder (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010), panic 
disorder with or without agoraphobia (Carleton, Fetzner, Hackl, & McEvoy, 2013; Fetzner, 
Horswill, Boelen, & Carleton, 2013), health anxiety (Boelen & Carleton, 2012; Fetzner et al., 
2013; Wright et al., this issue), posttraumatic stress symptoms and disorder (Banducci, Bujarski, 
Bonn-Miller, Patel, & Connolly, this issue; Bardeen, Fergus, & Wu, 2013; Boelen, Reijntjes, & 
Smid, this issue; Fetzner et al., 2013; Oglesby, Boffa, Short, Raines, & Schmidt, this issue), and 
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depression (de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; G entes & Ruscio, 2011). More recently, 
evidence suggests IU plays an important role in eating disorders (Konstantellou, Campbell, 
Eisler, Simic, & Treasure, 2011; Renjan, McEvoy, Handley, Fursland, & Byrne, this issue; 
Sternheim et al., 2011), autism spectrum disorders (Boulter, Freeston, South, & Rodgers, 2014), 
prolonged grief (Boelen, 2010; Boelen et al., this issue), hoarding behaviors (Oglesby et al., 
2013; Wheaton, Abramowitz, Jacoby, Zwerling, & Rodriguez, 2016), adult separation anxiety 
(Boelen, Reijntjes, & Carleton, 2014), and anger-related emotions (Anderson, Deschênes, & 
Dugas, this issue; Fracalanza, Koerner, Deschênes, & Dugas, 2014). Not only is IU associated 
with multiple disorders, but trait and disorder-specific IU are correlated with escalating 
comorbidity (Dupuy & Ladouceur, 2008; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012; Yook, Kim, Suh, & Lee, 
2010). Moreover, many clinical features of disorders can be conceptualized as efforts to alleviate 
or avoid uncertainty (Krohne, 1989). Taken together, the overwhelming evidence supports IU as 
a transdiagnostic process linked to an array of disorders.  
The prospective and inhibitory dimensions of IU have been differentially associated with 
emotional disorder symptoms (Carleton, Norton, et al., 2007; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011). 
McEvoy and Mahoney (2011) found associations between prospective IU and symptoms of 
GAD and obsessive-compulsive disorder, while inhibitory IU was associated with symptoms of 
social anxiety, depression, and panic disorder, agoraphobia in a clinical sample. Their results are 
consistent with research linking inhibitory IU with social anxiety, depression (Carleton, 
Collimore, et al., 2010; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c), and panic disorder (Boelen et al., this 
issue), but inconsistent with an association between inhibitory IU and GAD and obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c). Furthermore, inhibitory IU has been 
associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (Boelen et al., this issue; Fetzner et al., 2013). The 
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results may indicate higher IU produces conflicting cognitive-motivational states. For example, 
prospective IU may promote approach strategies evident in some disorders, while inhibitory IU 
may promote avoidance behaviors (e.g., avoidance of situations that may induce panic in panic 
disorder). The recent conceptualization of these dimensions means relatively little research is 
available (e.g., Carleton, Collimore, et al., 2010; Carleton, Norton, et al., 2007; Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012c; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2011), and the available results have not been entirely 
consistent. 
8.2 What is unknown?  
The original IU model comprehensively outlined the centrality of IU for anxiety 
symptoms (Dugas et al., 1998), but was designed within the context of GAD symptoms. Despite 
the success and longevity of the model, the mechanisms by which IU exerts influence on worry 
remain less clear (Bredemeier & Berenbaum, 2008). Different cognitive and behavioral 
constructs may be involved at different stages of worry (Meeten, Dash, Scarlet, & Davey, 2012; 
Thielsch, Andor, & Ehring, 2015); as such, prospective longitudinal designs appear necessary to 
understand how IU and other constructs initiate and perpetuate repetitive negative thinking and 
cyclical interrelationships with disorder symptoms (e.g., Oglesby et al., this issue; Thielsch et al., 
2015).  
The relative influence of IU across disorders also remains uncertain (Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012c). Anxiety appears inherently dependent upon uncertainty (Carleton, 2016; Grupe 
& Nitschke, 2013; Hong & Cheung, 2015); as such, most contemporary research has justifiably 
focused on anxiety disorders. Despite the current research indicating IU is transdiagnostic and 
phenomenologically concurrent with anxiety disorders, mood disorders, personality disorders, 
and normative processes, there is a relative paucity of research exploring the causal, 
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precipitating, maintaining, mediating, and moderating aspects of the relationships. Future 
research should clarify the relative significance of IU dimensions across disorders. 
Accordingly, researchers should explore IU as contextualized within extant cognitive-
behavioral models for all such disorders, normative processes, and transdiagnostic models 
(Carleton, 2012; Einstein, 2014; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012c). The exploration should explicitly 
incorporate IU into existing theoretical and treatment models, while also facilitating novel 
theoretical frameworks and broader integrations with psychology (e.g., Brosschot, Verkuil, & 
Thayer, this issue; Carleton, 2016). Doing so would inform case formulation, treatment planning, 
and novel interventions targeting diagnosis-specific and transdiagnostic processes.   
9. Intolerance of Uncertainty and Clinical Applications  
9.1 What is known?  
Theoretical progression in psychopathology research has been complemented by laudable 
developments in the treatments of emotional disorders. In line with this, maladaptive thoughts 
and behavioral processes have been considered valuable targets for intervention (Barlow, 2000).  
There has also been a shift in perspective from diagnosis-specific conceptualizations and 
treatment approaches to transdiagnostic models highlighting the substantial similarities (Barlow, 
Allen, & Choate, 2004; Barlow et al., 2014; Norton & Paulus, 2015). Relatedly, robust 
relationships between IU and psychopathology implicate IU as a potentially critical 
transdiagnostic treatment target.   
Dugas and colleagues (Dugas et al., 2010; Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Dugas et al., 2003; 
Dugas & Robichaud, 2007) have developed a cognitive-behavioral intervention for GAD, 
targeting IU reductions by fostering less negative beliefs about uncertainty. The intervention has 
been supported by several randomized clinical trials with moderate to large effects (Dugas et al., 
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2010; Dugas et al., 2003; Gosselin, Ladouceur, Morin, Dugas, & Baillargeon, 2006; Ladouceur, 
Dugas, et al., 2000; see Robichaud, 2013).  
Research has also examined other cognitive-behavioral interventions that do not 
specifically target IU, but nonetheless have shown a reduction in IU and symptoms of social 
anxiety (Hewitt, Egan, & Rees, 2009; Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012b), health anxiety (Langlois & 
Ladouceur, 2004), anxiety and depressive disorders (Bomyea et al., 2015), delivered as 
individual and group transdiagnostic interventions (Boswell et al., 2013; Talkovsky & Norton, 
this issue). A randomized control trial for GAD compared the effectiveness of an IU-therapy, 
metacognitive therapy, and a delayed treatment control condition (van der Heiden, Muris, & van 
der Molen, 2012). Results indicated significant symptom reductions and clinically significant 
change in both therapy conditions; however, metacognitive therapy was superior across the range 
of outcome measures. Interestingly, metacognitive therapy was also associated with the largest 
reductions of IU, suggesting interventions from alternative theoretical frameworks may influence 
IU (McEvoy & Erceg-Hurn, this issue; van der Heiden et al., 2012). 
Increasing evidence suggests that changes in IU may be driving changes in symptoms of 
multiple emotional disorders (i.e., transdiagnostic) and across different treatment protocols (i.e., 
transtherapy, e.g., McEvoy & Erceg-Hurn, this issue; Roemer & Orsillo, 2007; Treanor et al., 
2011). Changes in IU have been uniquely linked to changes in repetitive negative thinking across 
all disorders and treatment programs even after controlling for trait negative affectivity (McEvoy 
& Erceg-Hurn, this issue). Those changes in IU were also associated with changes in GAD and 
social anxiety disorder symptoms, but not depression symptoms. Taken together, the results 
suggest that IU is a transdiagnostic change factor associated with changes in repetitive negative 
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thinking and symptoms across different disorders and treatment interventions (Boswell et al., 
2013; McEvoy & Erceg-Hurn, this issue; Talkovsky & Norton, this issue).  
Abramowitz and Arch (2014) made a compelling argument that exposure-driven 
cognitive-behavioral treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder may benefit from 
strengthening inhibitory learning of nonthreatening associations (e.g., uncertainty is intolerable), 
such that uncertainty becomes increasingly acceptable as normal across contexts. Abramowitz 
and Arch (2014) suggest treatment should emphasize tolerating uncertainty through exposure, 
which may strengthen inhibitory associations. Others have argued that “in many ways, all 
therapies can be described as attempts to mitigate IU” (Carleton, 2012, p. 942); accordingly, 
future researchers should examine whether principles of IU exposure can be applied 
transdiagnostically and across treatment protocols to support broad symptom improvements.  
9.2 What is unknown?  
There are many unknowns associated with IU treatment and emotional disorders. Extant 
cognitive-behavioral therapies can be readily modified to target fears related to IU and avoidance 
behaviors; however, research is needed to establish the efficacy of such treatments (Mahoney & 
McEvoy, 2012a). Currently IU is an implicit component within treatment protocols derived from 
alternative theoretical frameworks; nevertheless, research suggests that IU could also be more 
explicitly assessed and targeted. Evidence suggests cognitive-behavioral treatments decrease IU 
(Mahoney & McEvoy, 2012a), though some researchers have found evidence that directly 
targeting IU may be no more effective than indirectly targeting IU (van der Heiden et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, there is a need for more research evaluating and comparing interventions designed 
to directly target IU with interventions that are non-specific to IU. For a more complete 
understanding of change processes, Treanor (2011) recommended treatment mechanism research 
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grounded in specific theoretical models. More recently, Einstein (2014) proposed a 
transdiagnostic IU treatment model with several potential pathways for explicitly targeting 
different IU dimensions, all of which remains to be explored. 
In the interim, the processes by which IU changes in therapy remain relatively unknown. 
Bomyea and colleagues (2015) found that over the course of treatment changes in IU 
significantly mediated changes in worry, which is an important step (Kazdin, 2007), but research 
is needed to understand the mechanisms of such change across different treatment interventions. 
Currently there are many different therapies and a thorough understanding of the most critical 
change mechanisms may contribute to a more parsimonious and efficient therapeutic approach. 
Specific (e.g., exposure) and non-specific therapeutic factors (e.g., therapist features, motivation 
to engage in treatment) need to be measured when evaluating treatment interventions so we can 
better understand the relative contributions to changes in IU. 
The potential clinical utility of targeting disorder-specific IU should also be investigated. 
Disorder-specific IU predicts symptoms of a range of disorders (e.g., Thibodeau et al., 2015), 
suggesting treatment protocols may benefit from tailored modification of disorder-specific IU. 
For example, tolerating uncertainty about others’ evaluations might improve social anxiety 
symptoms and relapse rates beyond reducing the perceived probability and cost of such 
evaluations. Thus there are questions remaining about whether clinicians should target trait IU, 
disorder-specific IU, or a combination of various proportions that may vary by disorder 
(Thibodeau et al., 2015).   
Experimental and clinical research using behavioral methods to corroborate IU before, 
during, and after treatment would also be beneficial to assess clinical impacts more broadly 
(Boswell et al., 2013; McEvoy & Erceg-Hurn, this issue). Much of the available treatment 
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literature has been carried out by the same research team and replications are needed. Moreover, 
there still remains a predominant focus on GAD and future studies should investigate the impact 
of these interventions across a broader range of disorders.  
10. Continuing the Search for Certainties  
IU is increasingly considered to be important to the development, perpetuation, and 
treatment of psychopathology. Basic IU research offers novel and exciting perspectives for 
understanding psychopathology. The current paper provides a broad IU research agenda with 
several methodological suggestions for exploring trait, disorder-specific, and transdiagnostic 
conceptualizations. The review also highlights the need to research normative responses, 
developmental origins, behaviors, decision-making, and cognitive vulnerabilities related to IU, 
while understanding relationships with threat and risk. In all cases, explicit integration of IU into 
theoretical and therapeutic models appears warranted. The increasing focus of research into 
uncertainty and IU has generated numerous avenues for exploring unknown territory in 
psychology; as such, future researchers should not fear the unknowns, but rather face them head 
on as we strive to address the uncertainties that remain.  
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